Optimal Interaction between Shareholders and Employees on Issuing Employee Stock Options within a Stackelberg Game Framework, M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology ; Modarres Yazdi, Mohammad (Supervisor)
Abstract
This paper investigates the interaction between the beneficiaries of an employee stock option plan within a Stackelberg game framework. The beneficiaries are shareholders and employees. In the proposed model, shareholders, as the leaders of the Stackelberg game, determine the optimal features of employee stock option grants. In response, employees, the followers of the proposed Stackelberg game, maximize their own profits by determining their own effort level by considering that every effort level of employees has an associated cost and expected income for employees. It is assumed that the stock price follow Geometric Brownian Motion process with a known drift rate and volatility. Also, it...
Cataloging briefOptimal Interaction between Shareholders and Employees on Issuing Employee Stock Options within a Stackelberg Game Framework, M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology ; Modarres Yazdi, Mohammad (Supervisor)
Abstract
This paper investigates the interaction between the beneficiaries of an employee stock option plan within a Stackelberg game framework. The beneficiaries are shareholders and employees. In the proposed model, shareholders, as the leaders of the Stackelberg game, determine the optimal features of employee stock option grants. In response, employees, the followers of the proposed Stackelberg game, maximize their own profits by determining their own effort level by considering that every effort level of employees has an associated cost and expected income for employees. It is assumed that the stock price follow Geometric Brownian Motion process with a known drift rate and volatility. Also, it...
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