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    Why Do Firms Bid Stepwise Rather Than Uniform in a Pay-as-bid
    Electricity Market?

    , M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology Aghdasi, Bijan (Author) ; Rahmati, Mohammd Hossein (Supervisor) ; Alishahi, Kasra (Supervisor)
    Abstract
    Why firms does not submit several steps in their bids curve? In this paper, we present a mathematical model for the behavior of power plants in a Pay-as-Bid auction market. According to this model, in the case that the power plant has a fixed marginal cost, the optimal behavior for him is to offer only one price, but in the case of linear marginal cost, bidding one price is not an optimal price, and with increasing the slope of this function, the number of steps and their price level will increase. We also show that increasing the level of competition in the market will force the plants to lower the price level and the number of steps. The model of this paper also predicts the factors... 

    A Comparison between Different Methods of Auction in Electricity Markets

    , M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology Khanalizadeh, Zahra (Author) ; Rahmati, Mohammad Hossein (Supervisor) ; Vesal, Mohammad (Supervisor)
    Abstract
    We present a theoretical model for the strategic behavior of power plants in the electricity wholesale market in the pay-as-bid auctioning format. We obtain the optimization condition which is a relationship that relates the strategy function of each firm to its cost function and the probability distribution of the market-clearing price from the viewpoint of that firm. Next, by obtaining the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the pay-as-bid and the uniform-price markets separately and by simulation, we calculate the total production cost in both cases and compare it with the social planner case. Our results show that the uniform-price auction is on average closer to the social planning case... 

    Effects of Price Ceiling on Uniform Price Electricity Auction Markets

    , M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology Moshrefi, Hamid Reza (Author) ; Ebrahimnejad, Ali (Supervisor) ; Mohaghegh, Mohsen (Supervisor)
    Abstract
    One of the most common applications of multi-unit auctions is the energy markets, including the electricity markets. In this study, using the simulation of a uniform price wholesale electricity market, the effects of the price ceiling on the behavior of power plants and market clearing prices have been investigated. The results show that the implication of price ceilings causes power plants to reduce the slope of their bidding function near the ceiling price, and as a result, the market-clearing price decreases compared to the previous state in the absence of the price ceiling. It was also observed that the higher the probability of reaching the price ceiling (higher total demand), the more... 

    Strategy deviation index as a new reactive market power indicator

    , Article IET Conference Publications, 7 November 2010 through 10 November 2010, Agia Napa ; Volume 2010, Issue 572 CP , 2010 ; 9781849193191 (ISBN) Rahmat Samii, R ; Nourizadeh, S ; Ranjbar, A. M ; Sharif University of Technology
    2010
    Abstract
    Reactive market power assessment is an important issue for ISOs and the regulators of the reactive power market. Due to the localized characteristics of reactive power as a technical support and its monopsonistic nature as an economic commodity, a vivid reactive market power index including market share, demand side and cost is not achieved yet. In this paper, a new reactive market power index is presented which is based on bidding strategy deviation of the GENCOs after establishing a uniform price auction reactive market. Not knowing others' offers to ISO, each unit faces a bidding strategy problem that is solved using game theory. Considering its production costs, the unit uses the...