Sharif Digital Repository

Cooperation among nodes is important in ad hoc networks since in such networks nodes depend on each other for forwarding packets. However, cooperation in such operations consumes nodes energy and recourses. Therefore, it is necessary to design incentive mechanisms to enforce nodes to forward packets when the source and destination of the packet are other nodes in the network. We study routing in ad hoc and wireless networks from a game theoretic view point. Based on this view, the network consists of selfish and greedy nodes who accept payments for forwarding data for other nodes if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. Also, route falsification attacks are... 

We study Nash equilibria in the setting of network creation games introduced recently by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou, and Shenker. In this game we have a set of selfish node players, each creating some incident links, and the goal is to minimize α times the cost of the created links plus sum of the distances to all other players. Fabrikant et al. proved an upper bound O(√α) on the price of anarchy: the relative cost of the lack of coordination. Albers, Eilts, Even-Dar, Mansour, and Roditty show that the price of anarchy is constant for α = O(√n) and for α ≥ 12n[lgn], and that the price of anarchy is 15(1 + (min{α/n, n 2/alpha;}) 1/3) for any α. The latter bound shows the first... 

Cooperation among nodes is vital in wireless networks since in such networks nodes depend on each other for routing packets. However, cooperation in such operations consumes nodes recourses such as battery and bandwidth. Therefore, it is necessary to design incentive mechanisms to enforce nodes to forward packets when the source and destination of the packet are other nodes. We study routing in wireless networks from a game theoretic view point. Based on this view, the network consists of greedy and selfish nodes who accept payments for forwarding data for other nodes if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. Also, route falsification attacks are easy to... 

Cooperation among nodes is vital in Mobil Ac Hoc Networks (MANETs) since in such networks nodes depend on each other for forwarding and routing packets. However, cooperation in such operations consumes nodes' recourses such as battery and bandwidth. Therefore it is necessary to design incentive mechanisms to enforce nodes to forward packets when the source and destination of the packet are other nodes. In this paper, we present a distributed fair solution to judge, punish and re-admit a selfish node, forcing nodes to cooperate with each other. Our scheme is different from previous ones in that it combines two characteristics that have been separately handled in previous works. The first... 

Performance of routing is severely degraded when misbehaving nodes drop packets instead of properly forwarding them. In this paper, we propose a Game-Theoretic Adaptive Multipath Routing (GTAMR) protocol to detect and punish selfish or malicious nodes which try to drop information packets in routing phase and defend against collaborative attacks in which nodes try to disrupt communication or save their power. Our proposed algorithm outranks previous schemes because it is resilient against attacks in which more than one node coordinate their misbehavior and can be used in networks which wireless nodes use directional antennas. We then propose a game theoretic strategy, ERTFT, for nodes to... 

Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are based on the assumption of that all participants in the network cooperate and forward packets towards the destinations. However, due to the limited nature of the nodes' resources, a node may decide not to cooperate to save its resources while still using the network. Such behavior of some nodes may degrade the whole network performance. To cope with such a situation, we propose a Stable path, Low overhead, Truthful, and Cost efficient (SLTC) routing protocol which stimulates nodes to cooperate. SLTC utilizes the game theoretic notion of mechanism design. To the best of our knowledge, SLTC is the first protocol attaining the message complexity of O(nd),... 

In New applications of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), nodes may decide not to cooperate in routing protocols in order to save their limited resources while still using the network to relay their own traffic. Exhibiting such a selfish behavior by even a few nodes may degrade network performance and other cooperating nodes may find themselves unfairly loaded. To cope with such a situation, we propose a Stable path, Low overhead, Truthful, and Cost efficient (SLTC) routing protocol which stimulates nodes to cooperate and act truthfully by utilizing the game theoretic notion of mechanism design. To the best of our knowledge, SLTC is the first protocol attaining the message complexity of O(nd),... 

Locally multipath adaptive routing (LMAR) protocol, classified as a new reactive distance vector routing protocol for MANETs is proposed in this paper. LMAR can find an ad-hoc path without selfish nodes and wormholes using a random search algorithm in polynomial-time. Also when the primary path fails, it discovers an alternative safe path if network graph remains connected after eliminating selfish/malicious nodes. The main feature of LMAR to seek safe route free of selfish and malicious nodes in polynomial time is its searching algorithm and flooding stage that its generated traffic is equiloaded compared to single-path routing protocols but its ability to bypass the attacks is much better...